

PROVIDED BY ROBERT M. SULLIVAN

1966 4 Aug 66 0600 5 Aug 66 1

37th Combat Support Group

Phu Cat Air Base, APO 96238

- 1 1900 THOMAS This is the beginning of the record of Air Police activities at Phu Cat AB, Republic of Vietnam.
- 2 1901 THOMAS DELAYED ENTRY: Captain Robert M. Sullivan and fifty-three (53) Air Policemen arrived at Phu Cat AB at 1200, 1 August 1966. Security was immediately established. No reportable incidents have occurred as of this time and date.
- 3 1902 THOMAS GUARDMOUNT: TSgt Thomas, "A" Flt Cndr, held guardmount. All personnel present or accounted for, and posted as indicated on the reverse side of this blotter.
- 4 2100 THOMAS GUARDMOUNT: TSgt Jones, "B" Flt Cndr, held guardmount. All personnel present or accounted for and posted as indicated on the reverse side of this blotter.
- 5 2130 THOMAS INTRUDER: A2C Doumtz, Rook #10, reported that he had observed an unidentified person on his post and requested assistance. SAT dispatched to assist.
- 6 2131 THOMAS REP ENTRY #5: A2C Kubik, Rook #11, reported that he had just fired a single round at an unidentified person who was running on his post. Mortar illumination requested. The SAT searched all surrounding posts, but no person was found. Approx 20 mortars were fired for illumination and the search was dismissed at 2150 hrs. All guards returned to normal duty.
- 7 2210 THOMAS RRK AREA: Mortar flares were observed by personnel from this office that were illuminating the RRK Area, followed by explosions and tracer fire into and out of the area. SAT dispatched to runway to inform RRK personnel to move to a safer position.
- 8 2300 THOMAS POSSIBLE INTRUSION: A3C Schmidt, Knight #8, reported hearing voices and observing movement near his post. SAT dispatched and King #6, TSgt Truax, notified. Mortar illumination requested, and 7 rounds were fired while area was searched. No intruders found, and search discontinued at 2320 hrs.

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J. P. Thomas

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- 9 2330 THOMAS REF ENTRY # 7: SSgt Irwin, SAT Member, reported that the firefight in the RMK area had ceased, no injuries were sustained by RMK personnel or Friendly Forces, and the extent of damage to property and equipment was of a minor nature. SAT returned to normal patrol.
- 10 0400 JONES FLIGHT RELIEF: "A" Flight personnel relieved of duty at this time.
- 11 0600 JONES FLIGHT CHANGE: "C" Flight relieved "B" Flight of duty.

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37 CSG, APO 96238

ODIS H. JONES, TSgt, USAF

Odin H. Jones

INFORMATION SHEET ON SAPPER TACTICS:

By: 37th SPS Intelligence Section

With the recent attack on Cam Rahn Bay by enemy Sappers, with all intelligence indicators pointing to a country wide offensive directed toward maximum U.S. casualties and with POW and Hoi Chanh statements that the attacks will come in the early part of August, we must be aware of the tactics the enemy is likely to use. For this reason, this paper has been prepared in the hope that it will give each of you the most up to date knowledge of how the enemy is likely to enter PCAB.

The Sapper is not a hastily recruited, inexperienced, frightened peasant; he is a highly trained, deeply motivated, dangerous enemy soldier intent on sneaking past the perimeter fences, flares, mines, towers and bunkers. Once inside the base he will kill and maim as many Americans as he can find, and will destroy what ever equipment he can until his ammunition and explosives are exhausted. He is given training in body camouflage, the dangers of moonlight and reflections, and he is taught to inch along the ground spending hours if need be, to approach the target undetected. He is taught to disarm flares, cut or squeeze through barbed or concertina wire and to avoid the K-9 dogs by applying a mixture of animal fat and charcoal all over his body. He discards all clothing except a loin cloth and carries nothing except his weapons.

Tactics followed religiously by Sappers include a thorough visual recon of the target area and surrounding defenses. This is done 10 days to 2 weeks prior to an attack and no recons are ever performed within the five days preceding an attack. Maps and sand table models of the area are made and each man participating in the attack is shown the location of fences, guard posts, how often patrols pass the area, where the lighting is, how to enter the area and where to depart. Then they practice the attack in their camp to familiarize each man with the single file approach to the area, the break out into 3 or 4 man cells each going in a different direction to cause the most confusion and damage. They rely on the use of surprise to cause maximum casualties then withdraw quickly from a different direction than they entered.

Frequently a diversion is created by a mortar attack or sniper fire or explosions at some other part of the base. At any time mortars fall on base you should expect that Sappers are entering the perimeter somewhere else. They hope that the guards will be too busy looking for muzzle flashes, or watching the impacts, or even taking cover and this will prevent them from being detected at the perimeter. They are taught that our defenses are like an egg shell; difficult to penetrate, but once inside there is no more protection for the people or the equipment on the base.

BATTALION
The 3 or 4 man cell is always used by Sappers. The 304 ^{COMPANY} Co/300 Sapper Bn (who is targeted against PCAB) uses the 3 man cell in their attacks. One man carries an AK and hand grenades, one man the satchel charges and grenades, and the third the B-40 and his ammo. There is a strict order of fire; first the AKs are used, then the satchels and hand grenades, with the B-40 man firing last. He is likely to be a short distance from the other two and he provides fire against defensive troops who are in the area or who arrive on the

scene. The other two concentrate on the destruction of the target. Remember when you sight one man there will always be at least 2 others in the same area and quite probably several such teams nearby.

Both as a morale factor and to confuse the defenders, the Sappers will always try to carry off their wounded and dead comrades. There will always be a medical cell near the point of exit to give medical aid and provide stretchers for the wounded.

The 304th Sapper Company has attacked Phu Cat AB on:

24 Sep 68...7 individuals were sighted North of MMS area. 1 NVA Warrent Officer was captured.

28 Oct 68...an unk size enemy Sapper unit penetrated the base and used small arms and B-40s against buildings and personnel near the Caribou ramp.

22 Feb 69...12 Sappers in 4 cells of 3 men each, penetrated the fences NE of the MMS area, another group was to have created a diversion on the south end of the base, but failed to do so. Results 4 enemy KIA, 1 captured.

16 Arr 69...an unk number of Sappers were detected North of MMS area. Results enemy 1 KIA.

20 Jun 69...ROK forces were making a sweep in the area SE of PCAB, from which we had been mortared on 17 Jun. Approx 500 meters across the river, they engaged a five man enemy unit. Results 4 enemy KIA, 1 captured. This unit was identified as the 304th Sapper Co. The only conclusion is that they were planning an attack on the base but were detected before they could actually begin.

How many times we may have been penetrated on recon missions only the enemy knows for sure, but the man captured on 24 Sep had been in previously. The group on 28 Oct knew exactly how to get in and out without being detected, and the man captured on 22 Feb stated recon patrols had entered the base several days prior to the attack. One diary captured when an NVA officer was killed north of the base, had a map of the base and the entry points he had used when he reconned the base. We are not impregnable, but the strength of our defenses is measurable in how alert and efficient each individual Security Policeman is while on duty.