Victory in battle can be measured in a variety of ways. Territory
captured or defended and casualty losses verses enemy losses are probably
the two most frequent measures of success in battle. Using these criteria,
the battle won by the 3rd SPS during TET, 1968,
can only be measured as a stirring victory.
The battle took place in Bien Hoa AB, Republic of Vietnam, during the North Vietnam TET offensive,
January/February 1968 . The 3rd SPS killed
and captured 160 enemy while losing two of their own, for a kill/capture
ratio of 80-1.
The battle started with a long
rocket-mortar barrage. Undercover of the barrage, the enemy maneuvered
undetected through the mined double-chain-link perimeter fence line
until detected by a sentry dog [Diablo X313, KIA] and his handler Bob Press. The combined VC/NVA
(North Vietnam Army) force fought their way on base as far as the
aircraft engine buildup area, approximately 50/60 yards from the reveted
F-100 aircraft with the SP's taking them under fire all the way. The
enemy's initial thrust was impeded by sentry dogs and their handlers,
bunkers manned by SP machine gunners and riflemen, Sabotage Alert
Teams (SAT) with jeeps-mounted M60 machine guns and Quick Reaction
Forces (QRF) riflemen. The enemy advance was halted at the engine
buildup with a counter attack led by an NCO. Bunkers were bypassed
and in some cases surrounded, but none were overrun.
One of the SP KIA's (the squadron
Operations Officer [Capt. Maisey]), received a direct hit by a shoulder-fired rocket
launcher (RPG), while directing the defense of an old French bunker
[Bunker Hill-10] on the perimeter. The other SP lost was an Augmentee [A1C Muse, KIA] (about 50 Augmentees
had been trained by the SP's to help defend the base) KIA by a grenade
during the fight at the engine buildup area. Fighting continued until
dawn when the flight commander formed a skirmish line and drove the
enemy, not already killed or wounded, back across the base perimeter.
The perimeter fence line was 10 miles in length and although the ground
attack only came from the cast side, sniper fire was received from
other directions most notably from north perimeter which was adjacent
to the city of Bien Hoa. US Army
ground force did not arrive until after day break when only enemy
wounded and stragglers were left on the base. No Army of South Vietnam
(ARVN) personnel were present during any part of the battle. The US
Army unit pursued the enemy outside the perimeter and drove them back
into the jungle.
The SP Squadron had no crew-serviced
weapons, the M60 machine gun being the heaviest weapons authorized.
Fortunately, the Army 145 Aviation Battalion was stationed on the base
and throughout the battle gave unwavering air-support to the SP's;
without the 145th's support undoubtedly the squadron would have taken
additional casualties. At one point during the battle the squadron
borrowed a recoilless rifle team from the QC (South Vietnamese Security
Police), to dislodge some enemy holdup in a shack. In addition to
no crew-serviced weapons, no armored vests, no perimeter lighting,
gasoline filled drums, claymore mines or searchlights to cover enemy
approach routes. We had no armored vehicles, only jeeps, pickup trucks
and stake trucks borrowed from the motor pool for QRT's.
Fortunately 7th AF placed the
squadron on maximum alert that afternoon prior to the attack but we
were not told why
, so many of us thought this was just a prolonging
of the many false intelligence reports received in the past.
After Action reports listed the
enemy forces at two battalions and a reinforced CO [1600-2000 VC/NVA]. This meant
the squadron was outnumbered 4 or 5 to one as our Present for Duty
(PFD), including Augmentees were around 400.
The Security Police were prohibited
from operating outside the perimeter. The Army was responsible for
security outside the perimeter. The official scenario was that we
would never be attack by more than a platoon. On previous occasions
when the Squadron had conducted night ambushes or perimeter sweeps
the Squadron Commander was called in and told to halt such operations
as the Army had everything outside the perimeter under control. Prior
to the attack, higher authorities were notified that the majority of
the time no Army was securing the perimeter. The Squadron Commander
was told otherwise and to keep the squadron inside the perimeter.
The only official exception was that 50 squadron members were granted
permission to attend the 173rd Airborne Brigade's week long training
they gave all of their new troops. The training climaxed with a helicopter
assault into the base, a night defensive perimeter and a search mission
back to the base. The 173rd main base was tied into the Air Base and
was also attacked during TET. The Division replaced the 173rd earlier
but they only had a rifle CO and MP's at their base camp and
were hard pressed to defend their area.
TET was not the squadron's first
encounter with the enemy. During 1967 numerous enemy sapper teams
(sabotage team), were stopped at the perimeter sometimes in brisk
fire fights. In August 1967, the squadron captured their first prisoner
in one of these firefights.
Numerous decorations were awarded
squadron personnel as a result of the TET battle, including Air Force
Cross, Silver Stars, and Bronze Stars with the Valor devise. I do
not know the total number of decorations awarded as I rotated prior
to any being awarded. Also, I do not know the disposition of the 10
or 12 wounded as the most critical were evacuated off base immediately
after the battle.
I am aware that due to the bravery,
ability and devotion to duty of the Junior Officers, NCO's and Airmen,
the 3rd SPS were notout fought.
Although out-gunned and out numbered they were ready and willing when
called upon to do their duty. They thought they were the best and
proved it.
