

FROM: Golf 3 SAT Ldr, C Flt Scty, 377th SPS

11 February 1968

SUBJECT: Pre & Post Atk Rpt (31 Jan 68, TSNAB, RVN)

TO: Commander, C Flight Security

1. The following is a brief report of Pre & Post attack activities of Golf 3 Security Alert Team

a. Members: Sgt Billups, John C., AF14 [REDACTED] (Machinegunner)

ALC Underwood, R. E., AF25 [REDACTED] (Rider)

b. Assigned Area: Tango 17 to 056 Gate on the Northeast perimeter

c. At approximately 0310 hours, 31 Jan 68 (tour of duty started at 1800 hours, 30 Jan 68), while patrolling the Northeast outer perimeter road, my SAT came under heavy tracer fire approximately 15 meters North of the 2nd Service Battalion bunker PD2A. This incoming fire was from an automatic weapon position directly North of my location and approximately 50 meters out from the perimeter fence. The fire was being directed at my position, the POL Tank Farm, CBPO area and the C-130 revements.

d. At approximately 0312 hours I notified CSC of the situation.

e. At approximately 0317 hours Captain DeNisio, Wpns Sys Scty Ops Officer, and 1st Lt Grover, C Flt Scty Comdr, arrived at my location and I briefed them on the situation. I was directed to hold my position, then Captain DeNisio and Lt Grover departed to the West on the outer perimeter road.

f. At approximately 0322 hours I overheard on the SP radio that the Viet Cong were assualting and penetrating the 051 Bunker and 051 Gate to my West.

g. At approximately 0325 hours my SAT and I heard heavy explosions and automatic weapons fire coming from the vicinity of the MACV Annex. Also at this time I could see mortar rounds impacting approximately 150 meters to my North in the hamlet.

h. At approximately 0330 hours we could see the mortars being walked in from the hamlet to our North. Still heavy automatic weapons fire in the MACV Annex. Small arms fire being directed at our position again.

i. At approximately 0335 hours I decided to relocate the position of my SAT, as we were in the "V" of the perimeter road and there was no protection whatsoever. I moved my team to the PD2A Bunker, approximately 15 meters to our East, on the outer perimeter road. I left my jeep on the road as it was impossible to get to it due to the fire.

j. At approximately 0350 hours we were still receiving light fire from several positions off base. I made good contact with the two ARVN troops at the bunker and they explained to me that they expected the enemy to infiltrate the Northeast perimeter. Based on this information and the sound of approaching mortar fire I decided to remain at this bunker and not to return to the inner perimeter road.

k. 0415 hours we could hear grenade explosions off the East perimeter. Tracer fire still very heavy at the MACV Annex. Mortar rounds still impacting in the hamlet to our North.

l. At approximately 0620 hours I decided that no threat of a ground penetration existed on the Northeast perimeter so I pulled my SAT out and returned to the inner perimeter road. Enroute to the inner perimeter we received several rounds of sniper fire. Prior to pulling out I noticed that the civilians who lived in the house next to PD2A had come out and either did not seem to know what was happening or did not care what was happening.

m. Between approximately 0700 hours and 1100 hours my SAT and I checked SP posts, patrolled the inner perimeter road and responded to numerous calls from SP posts reporting sniper fire. Heavy mortar and automatic weapons fire could be seen in the MACV Annex area and off the East perimeter.

n. At approximately 2100 hours my SAT was dispatched to the Civilian Air Terminal to check out a reported sniper with an automatic weapon. Upon arrival my team was brought under fire by the sniper and we engaged same. Several minutes later I pulled my team out of the area because we had no radio comm with other SP units who were also engaging the enemy. On the scene were two other SATs, Terminal Security and VN Civilian Police. I returned to normal patrol.

o. At approximately 0200 hours, 1 February, my SAT responded to Tango 14 who was reported by CSC to have been pinned down by snipers. I drove the inner perimeter road as far as the 79th Compound where we were pinned down by heavy automatic weapons fire from the 056 gate. As I could neither advance or withdrawal I notified CSC of this and was directed to stay put until I could get out.

p. At approximately 0240 hours the firing at the 056 gate was light enough to where I decided to move out to Alpha Post 8, and to Tango 14. Enroute to Tango 14 we received moderate sniper as was confirmed by the sentry on Alpha Post 15 who stated that he could see numerous tracer rounds being directed at my jeep as we passed the 056 Gate.

q. At approximately 0300 hours, 3 February, my SAT responded to Tango 15 to investigate a reported sniper. Shortly thereafter we received fire from the suspected position and returned same.

r. At approximately 0400 hours Tango 15 reported moderate sniper fire from the same position. Bravo 1 SAT, TSGT Hurley and my SAT responded to the post and assaulted the position which resulted in the burning of the suspected position (a house, two story) and possible killing of two VC. Numerous secondary explosions came from the burning house...Possible small arms ammunition and grenades.

s. At approximately 0430 hours, 4 February Tango 16 reported a sniper position to the East of his post. Bravo 1 and my SAT responded and assaulted the position which resulted in the burning of three houses, numerous large explosions (possible grenades and B-40 rockets), and a reported body count of twenty (+) enemy.

t. During the evening of 5 February my SAT responded to the Air Vietnam hanger to investigate a reported sniper. Together our teams, Golf 2, checked the area with negative results.

u. At approximately 2200 hours, 7 February my SAT escorted four US Army officers from the 056 gate to the Joint General's Staff Compound (JGS) which is located 100 meters South of the 3rd Field Hospital, Saigon.

2. During the period 30 January 1968 to 11 February 1968 I was the assigned leader of Golf 3 Security Alert Team. During this period I witnessed Sgt Billups and ALC Underwood perform their duties in a most commendable and dedicated manner. Not once did they hesitate to seek out snipers or subject themselves to enemy fire so as to locate the origin of the fire.

CHRISTOPHER M. GODFREY, SGT, USAF
Golf 3 SAT Leader