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RECEIVED  
Director  
Aerospace Studies Inst  
ATTN: Archives Branch  
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

17 JUL 1992

*7/14/92*  
*LDH*  
**DECLASSIFIED**  
SEA Declassification & Review Team  
Date: *6 Jul 92* Init: *LDH*

*Robert Hiett - 10/10/92*



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



IGSL (4240)

8 DEC 1966

Combat After Action Report

377th CSG (BSL)

1. Because of the broad interest resulting from the 4 - 5 Dec 66 attack on Tan Son Nhut, this headquarters has received several requests for copies of subject report. AFISP has requested a copy of the report and has asked that it be expedited.

2. In view of the above, request that this headquarters be provided with 10 copies of subject report. Although expedient action is requested we do not wish to sacrifice quality for speed. This headquarters is aware of the many difficulties involved in reconstructing the attack particularly in view of the time span over which it occurred. If you desire assistance, please advise.

3. Request that every effort be made to beat the 25 Dec 66 suspense date as established by MACVD 335-8/7AFSUP 1.

FOR THE COMMANDER

SIGNED

FRANCIS E. WILKIE, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Director of Security and Law Enforcement

Cy to: PACAF (IGSL)  
USAF (AFISP)

*Typical Security*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: IGSS

17 MAY 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Actions Report, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN, 4 Dec 66,  
RCS: MACV J3-32 (Your Ltr, 12 May 1967)

TO: CINCPACAF (IGS)

1. Attached is a copy of the subject report as requested.
2. This letter contains no classified information.

FOR THE COMMANDER

*[Signature]*  
WILLIAM D. MYERS, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Deputy Director of Security Police

1 Atch  
377 Cmbt Spt Gp (BSP)(S-NOFORN)  
Ltr, lcy, 25 Dec 1966, Combat  
Operations After Actions Report,  
TSN AB, RVN, 4 Dec 1966, RCS: MACV  
J3-32 (U), w/6 Atch; Atch 1, Map  
of TSN AB with Key (C), lcy, Atch  
2, Detail "A" to atch 1 (C), lcy,  
Atch 3, Map, Saigon & TSN AB, (C)  
lcy, Atch 4, Map TSN AB Canine areas  
(U), Atch 5, Diagram, Damaged Air-  
craft parking positions (S) lcy,  
Atch 6, Photographs (U)

DECLASSIFIED

1667-1004  
16567-038



File 7-A2  
6-8-1

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 377TH COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP (PACAF)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: BSL (3141)

25 December 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Actions Report, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN, 4  
December 1966, RCS: MACV J3-32 (U)

TO: Commander  
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
Attn: J343  
APO San Francisco 96243

THRU: 7AF (IGSL)

1. (U) Name or Identity and/or Type of Operation: Combined mortar and sapper penetration attack against Tan Son Nhut Air Base.
2. (U) Dates of Operation: Time of mortar attack with accompanying penetration by assault unit: 0105-0315, 4 December 1966; search-and-destroy and counter-action continued until 1340, 5 December 1966.
3. (U) Location: Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon, Capital Military District, RVN.
4. (U) Control or Command Headquarters: Headquarters, Seventh Air Force (PACAF).
5. (U) Reporting Officer:

<u>Commander</u>	<u>Unit</u>
Colonel Grover K. Coe	377th Combat Support Group, TSN AB
Colonel James W. Graham	Special Troups, USARV, TSN AB
Colonel Joe B. Stocker	11th Avn Bn, Lia Khe AB
Colonel Robert W. Wood	Capital Avn Bn, TSN AB
Lt Col R. E. Gibson	4th ACS, Nha Trang AB
Lt Col Grove C. Johnson	377th Air Police Sq, TSN AB

Copy No. 11 of 40 Copies

BSL-66096

IG 67-1004  
IG 67-038

[REDACTED]

Lt Col Hugh H. Riddle	Provost Marshal, HAC, Saigon
Major Huynh Minh Bon	33rd Group (VNAF) TSN AB
Capt Vo Van Khoa	83rd Special Gp (VNAF) TSN AB
Capt Vo Ngoc Su	53rd Regional Forces Bn (ARVN) TSN AB
Capt Ngo Van Trieu	2nd Service Bn (ARVN) TSN AB

6. (C)(GP-4) Task Organizations:

a. 377th Air Police Squadron (PACAF)

(1) At approximately 2045 hours, 3 December 1966, maximum day-to-day security posture was reached with the posting of the 2000-0400 hours security flight. This was a force of 318 Air Policemen, consisting of 220 stationary/walking posts, 48 sentry-dog posts, 5 three-man primary Security Alert Teams (SATS), 5 three-man secondary SATS, 1 thirteen-man Quick Reaction Force (QRF), and CSC personnel including the Duty Officer and Flight Commander. In addition, Law Enforcement Section had reached its normal daily 1930-0330 hours posture of 25 one-man stationary/walking posts, 6 two-man patrols, and supervisory personnel for a total of 43. A total of 361 Air Police personnel were in a duty status at the time of the attack.

(2) The combined manning of Security and Law Enforcement sections at the time of the attack constituted 50% of the squadron present for duty strength. On 3-4 December 1966 the squadron was manned to 96% of its authorized strength and 98% of the assigned strength was present for duty; approximately 42% or 309 Air Policemen were available for emergency security duty. (q)

(3) A significant factor not reflected in this strength recapitulation is that 49% of the assigned strength had been in RVN less than sixty days. Thirty-five percent, including key senior NCO's, had been in RVN thirty days or less. (q)

b. Special Troops, USARV

(1) By 0240 all five platoons (30 men each) of the U. S. Army Quick Reaction Force (TF-35), Special Troops, USARV, had reported to their assembly point where they came under the operational control of Central Security Control (Joint US Command Post). This response was automatic and in accordance with Joint US Forces Defense Plan 1-66.



[REDACTED]

Two platoons were dispatched to the Old Bomb Dump area where they took up defensive positions, one platoon remained in the assembly area as a reserve QRF and as security for the new POL tank farm. The remaining two platoons were deployed along a line west of and perpendicular to the 07/25 runway as a blocking force. Task Force 35 made light contact with VC flushed out of hiding by Air Police, but did not directly engage the enemy during this operation. It should be emphasized however, that without the support of TF-35 the capability of the Air Police to concentrate their principal effort upon the destruction of known enemy forces would have been gravely impaired.

7. (C)(GP-4) Supporting Forces:

a. US Air Force

(1) Detachment 4, 4th Air Commando Squadron, Bien Hoa Air Base, RVN. This detachment was on the scene in AC-47 Dragon ships within fifteen minutes of the attack. Flare ships ("Spooky") 41, 42, and 43 dropped a total of 490 flares from 0120 to 0650. No ordnance was expended. Again on 5 December 1966 this unit dropped a total of 196 flares from 0030 to 0635. (o)

b. US Army

(1) Capital Aviation Battalion, Tan Son Nhut, RVN. The 120th Aviation Company of the parent battalion rendered immediate support with two UH-1B assault helicopter teams, each team consisting of two ships. The initial alert team was airborne in two minutes and moved toward suspected off-base VC mortar positions and their support base. This team was subsequently joined by the second team from the 120th Aviation Company and one team (Crossbow 36) from the 173rd Aviation Company, 11th Battalion, Lai Khe, RVN. These teams destroyed one building and damaged two adjacent buildings which the VC were using for shelter and destroyed one mortar position and two automatic weapons positions in the vicinity of coordinates XS 787.958. (See Atch 3). No body count was made on the scene. (SOURCE: G-2 Capital Military District.) One team provided on-call support to Air Police forces engaged on the west perimeter. This consisted of sweeping with automatic weapons fire the external area immediately adjacent to the entire western perimeter to harass and/or destroy VC attempting to enter/exit the base. These three teams also supported the Fifty-Third Regional Forces Battalion and the 30th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). (e)

(a) These three teams flew a total of 15:15 hours, expended 1600 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 303 rounds of 2.75 rockets, and 1000 rounds of 40mm. (r)

[REDACTED]

(2) At 0121 the Air Police Desk Sergeant notified the 716th Military Police Battalion (Saigon) that Tan Son Nhut Air Base was under mortar and ground attack. Military Police patrols in the vicinity of the airbase were immediately reinforced by the dispatch of eight additional two man patrols and road blocks/check points were established on all avenues of approach to the air base. At 0137 a Military Police alert force (26 men) took up defensive positions on the southern perimeter of the base in the area of the main gate.

c. Republic of Vietnam Air Force:

(1) The 83rd Special Group, VNAF, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN. This group scrambled two AlH's, code code name "Falcon Red", at 0137 on 4 December to assault the VC mortar position west of the base at XS 787.958. This team expended all ordnance on the suspected mortar position and huts near a factory complex being used by the VC as a sanctuary and aid station previously referred to in paragraph 7b(1), above. The team returned to base at 0330 hours.

(2) 33rd Group, VNAF, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN. This group responded rapidly to provide flare illumination for ground forces outside the base and for the Air Police force inside the base. C-47 aircraft Bravo, Charlie, and Delta dropped a total of 273 flares from 0105 until 0630, 4 December 1966. On the evening of 4 December and the early morning hours of 5 December, Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta C-47 aircraft dropped a total of 423 flares between 0145 and 0630. (o)

(3) 33rd Wing, VNAF, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN. The 33rd Wing possesses six (6) light tanks and a number of heavy military trucks which mount either twin 20mm cannon or Cal. .50 machine guns. The tanks are all located in fixed positions in the flight line area, and were not observed to take any actions contributory to base defense during the period of 4-6 December 1966. The large armed trucks normally carry a crew of three (3) VNAF personnel, and nightly patrol the outer perimeter roads or park with their guns covering approaches to the perimeter. During the early portion of the initial attack on 4 December 1966, two such trucks (each equipped with twin 20mm cannon) were patrolling the west perimeter road from 051 gate to 055 gate. These trucks were observed several times firing at random into dark areas in which no movement was reported or observed by Air Police in the vicinity. Some of these areas contained Air Police patrols. During the firefight between Air Police and VC forces on the west perimeter road, at 0235 hours, 4 December 1966, one of these trucks was caught on the edge of the VC attack and sustained minor small arms damage which apparently stopped the engine. All three VNAF crewmen abandoned the vehicle in the middle of the road and fled, leaving behind all their equipment including small arms. The second truck was



[REDACTED]

also in the area at the start of the engagement, moving north, and accelerated rapidly as the first shots were exchanged. On three separate occasions this vehicle almost collided with a jeep containing two Air Police officers as it twice reversed direction before finally taking up a position in the middle of the road facing away from the fire-fight in progress farther south on the same road. The gunner manned his weapons, bringing them to bear on positions occupied by Air Police approximately 250-300 meters away. Seeing this, one of the Air Police officers ran to the gun truck and shouted to the gunner not to fire. When the officer indicated that the guns were trained on Air Police positions the three-man crew abandoned their vehicle and fled. In doing so, one crewman snatched an automatic weapon from the bed of the truck, discharging it in the process and narrowly missing the Air Police officer by a few feet. The crew member immediately dropped the weapon and fled. This gun-truck with the other disabled vehicle remained abandoned until approximately first light after 0630 hours. (Q)

4. Republic of Vietnam Army:

(1) 55rd Regional Forces Battalion, ARVN. This unit dispatched a quick reaction force of approximately twenty men to the previously mentioned factory area to engage the VC and neutralize the mortar positions. While enroute this team was ambushed at approximately 0130 in the vicinity of XS 789.963. Elements reached the factory area at approximately 0200, made contact with VC and requested reinforcements from Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area. (e)

(2) 2nd Service Battalion, ARVN, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN. The 2nd Company of this battalion is responsible for defense of the west perimeter fence line of the air base. In addition to manning the twelve concrete bunkers which are on a line parallel with and adjacent to the west perimeter fence line, their personnel man the 051 and 055 gates, the former located at the south end of the west perimeter road, and the latter at the north end of the west perimeter road. The bunker closest to the VC point of penetration of the perimeter fence is located approximately 325 meters north of the 051 gate and 120 meters south of the point of penetration. The inability of the ARVN bunker guards to detect the VC force is attributed to the tall, dense vegetation in the area, darkness, and the fact that the penetration was carried out in a disciplined and orderly fashion calculated to reduce detection by ARVN/US personnel.

OUR POSITION  
ON WAS ON  
THE PERIMETER  
ROAD EAST.  
OH

SEE MY  
STATEMENT

(a) Subsequent to the initial penetration, a fire fight involving small arms, machine guns, and hand grenades broke out in this same location between the VC force and the Air Police. The perimeter road was the point of demarcation between the two opposing forces with the VC force closer to the ARVN guard tower. During this fire fight ARVN personnel in the bunker failed to fire at the enemy, although they had a clear field of fire and were well within effective range (120 meters). This is the fire fight in which two Air Policemen were killed in action. (See Atch 2) (b-2)

5

[REDACTED] AIRMAN Cole and  
Riddle.



[REDACTED]

(b) 3rd Company [REDACTED] n. This company has responsibility for external defense of the western side of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. At 0205, 4 December, this company deployed outside the west perimeter as a blocking force to prevent entry or exit by an enemy force, and at 0315 this battalion sent reinforcements to the referenced factory/mortar emplacement area to aid elements of the 53rd Battalion. At 0520 this unit began a sweep operation in their exterior area of responsibility, while Air Police formed a blocking force in the interior adjacent to the perimeter. (5) (NOTE: Information on the deployment of the 3rd Company was obtained from the US Army Advisors to that unit. The actual activities of this company are in doubt, for the following reasons: If the company deployed as described at 0205, they should have encountered the VC who engaged the Air Police at the west perimeter shortly thereafter; if the company was outside the perimeter shortly after 0205, it is unlikely that TSN Sensitive Area would have approved the UH-1B strafing of the area which followed, and there were no reported casualties among the 3rd Company.)

8. (C) (Gp-4) Intelligence: Intelligence gained through interrogation of two VC prisoners captured during the 4 December attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base disclosed the following: The VC units engaged in the assault against Tan Son Nhut consisted of the 1st and 2nd Platoons, 1st Company, 6th Battalion, 165th Regt., with a strength of 36 and 30 respectively. The battalion carried the designation of "V6", which is thought to be a cover name and a "SAPPER" unit. Platoons were equipped as follows: 1st Platoon: One 60mm Mortar with approximately six rounds of ammo. Two B-40 Anti-tank grenades (Chicom type 56, USSR Model RPG-2) with approximately eight rounds of ammunition. A number of AK submachine guns and carbines. A number of mines, explosives, and grenades. (g-2) 2nd Platoon: Four B-40's and approximately twelve rounds of ammunition. Two M-79 grenade launchers and thirty-six rounds of ammunition. A number of carbines and AK submachine guns. One CKC rifle. A number of BANGALORE torpedoes, mines, explosives and grenades. (g-2)

(a) Both platoons assembled at the road junction of LY VAN MANH, approximately eighteen kilometers from Tan Son Nhut Air Base, on 2 December. At 1900 the 1st Platoon left the shelter area of LY VAN MANH and moved out to VINH LOC (XS 700.970) arriving there at approximately 2100. At 1900 on 3 December the 2nd Platoon left LY VAN MANH, arriving at VINH LOC at approximately 2110. Both Platoons then moved out toward their objective at Tan Son Nhut, maintaining a separation distance of 100 meters. (See Atch 3) (g-2)

(b) The 1st Platoon was to be the reserve, while the 2nd Platoon penetrated and assaulted the air base for a fifteen minute period, withdrawing immediately thereafter. The 2nd Platoon penetrated the west perimeter of the base by cutting their way through three successive barbed wire fences and, apparently contrary to plan, was followed by an unknown



[REDACTED]

number of the 1st Platoon. The escape route was to be the same as the entry route.

c. An additional Platoon evidently was responsible for the off-base mortar position. One VC captured by the 53rd RF Bn stated that he was a member of the 3rd Company, 2nd Battalion, 165th VC Regiment. (c)

d.) In the month preceeding the attack there was no significant increase in intelligence reports received by the security force, quantitative and qualitative factors remaining static. The credibility of the majority of intelligence reports received was quite low, either because they were not rated or the rating assigned by the evaluating unit placed the intelligence in the "rumor" category. An intelligence report on what was probably the mortar force was furnished the security forces at 1730, 3 December, by the Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area, but no rating was assigned to this information. The message originated from an undisclosed source in Gia Dinh Province and was transmitted to intelligence officials through Go Vap. The source reported there was reason to believe that the 1st Company, 2nd Battalion, had moved into hamlets of Thong Tay Hoy village, and that its mission was to attack Tan Son Nhut on the night of 3-4 December 1966. (d-1) Thong Tay Hoy is located approximately ten kilometers west of the base. (NOTE: The Vietnamese Air Force Office of Investigation reports that the attack platoons stopped at and stayed in the Tan Hoa village on 3 December, while the Combined Military Interrogation Center reports that on 3 December the two platoons stopped to rest at the Vinh Loc area. This information is not contradictory as Tan Hoa village is in the Vinh Loc area).

e. Weather Conditions: On the night of 3-4 December, the weather was dry. Wind was from the south at five knots, and cloud cover was scattered at 5000 feet and broken at 15000. Visibility was seven miles. The moon was in its last quarters, rising at 2334 on 3 December and setting on 4 December at 1229. First light on 4 December occurred at 0634 and sun rose at 0657. (j) The cloud condition and the minimum of moonlight afforded excellent concealment for a penetration force. The south-to-north direction of the wind on the morning of 4 December was a limiting factor, hampering early detection of the penetrators by sentry dogs. The VC assault force route of entry and travel was west to east. Only those sentry-dogs immediately to the north of the entry route could detect the penetrators and alert to them. Unfortunately, populated areas and adverse terrain features downwind (north) from the VC force created a distance factor exceeding the dog's sensory capabilities, and teams were unable to make sensory detection of the penetrators. The VC managed to remain downwind from the sentry dog teams patrolling south of the populated area, (Ba Queo Receiver Site), thus precluding olfactory



[REDACTED]

alerts by those teams as well. The heavy growth of grass and shrubbery in the area penetrated by the VC was another factor seriously limiting the detection capability of the dogs, as the vegetation prevented the spread of scent on the slow moving breeze. All detection of Viet Cong within sentry dog areas of responsibility on the morning of 4 December was made by visual observations of the handlers, rather than by dog alerts. Conversely, on the evening of 4 December, sentry dogs were highly effective in detecting the presence of VC in several areas. This effectiveness is attributed to the fact that VC on the west side of the base were stationary (in hiding) or moving at a slow, cautious pace toward the west perimeter, while sentry dog teams were moving about their areas of responsibility in each of the four compass directions.

f. Terrain Features: The terrain traversed by the VC penetration force from the point of entry is overgrown by dense vegetation and includes large areas of construction site preparation, predominately earth moving and excavation for a new runway and drainage system. For the initial 750 meters their route was through thick, tall grass and bushes. The remaining portion of their route to the active runway was through a construction zone, intersected by drainage canals (10m x 6m) and high mounds of earth (7m x 4m). These features afforded the enemy excellent cover and concealment while approaching the runway. From the new runway construction area to the Mail Line of Resistance the terrain is devoid of obstacles, although the grass between the south side of the 07/25 runway and the MLR concertina barrier is sufficiently tall to offer concealment under the illumination conditions then prevailing.

9. (U) Mission: Omitted IAW MACVD 335-8/7AF Sup 1, para 9.

10. (U) Concept of Operation: Omitted IAW MACVD 335-8/7AF Sup 1, para 10.



[REDACTED]

11. (S) (Gp-3) Execution:

a. Phase I : 0110 - 1000, 4 December 1966.

(1) The initial alarm that VC had penetrated the base came via radio at 0110 when the sentry dog handler on post Alpha K-19, an area immediately to the north of the 07/25 runway, advised Central Security Control (CSC) that unidentified individuals were on the north side of his post. The Alpha Sector Primary SAT was dispatched to AK-19 to investigate the report and support the sentry dog team. Explosions and small arms fire began immediately after this, and CSC ordered execution of 377th Air Police Squadron Regulation 207-4, "Security Rapid Reaction Plan". (See paragraph 6d, above). (b-1) Almost simultaneously, at 0114, post Delta 15, an MLR bunker, reported that VC were coming through the Delta Sector MLR and that after firing at this group his weapon had jammed. This element of the Viet Cong assault force, estimated to number eight or nine, entered Taxi-way West-7 (W-7) from between concrete revetments No. 7 and No. 8, which contained RF-101 aircraft. (b-1) Concurrently, with the penetration of the MLR at Delta 15, another group consisting of at least thirteen VC crossed the 07/25 runway and attempted to proceed to the aircraft parking area via taxiway West Five (W-5). This latter element moved into the field of fire of post Delta 11, one of two M-60 machine gun bunkers on the Delta Sector MLR. The machine-gunner posted at Delta 11 is credited with nine VC dead, and two Air Policemen with him in that bunker, firing M-16s, are credited with killing the remaining four, three of whom attempted to out-flank the bunker and silence it from the rear (See Atch 1). As no VC were encountered by guards directly behind Delta 11, and no VC were observed successfully passing this post, it is assumed that either the entire group of VC was killed, or that any survivors fled north before being sighted by the Air Policemen on the MLR. While proceeding toward the machine gun bunker, the VC fired at least two B-40 anti-tank grenades (Chicom type 56, USSR Model, RPG-2) at the concrete revetments. One was fired perpendicular to revetment number 10, and the other was fired at an angle at revetment number 9. Neither grenade penetrated the full thickness of the concrete, but each penetrated 1 meter into the cement.

(2) Reconstruction of VC activity in the aircraft parking area by interviewing witnesses and by surveying the scene suggests that no member of the assault element succeeded in passing post Delta 11 at West Five taxiway. The group which penetrated the MLR breached the concertina wire by cutting a strand in the bottom tier, separating the coils with their hands, and crawling through. After passing between Revetments

[REDACTED]

No. 7 and 8 they stopped beside a pick-up truck which they used as cover while surveying the area. All except one continued south into the C-47 and helicopter parking area. At this time CSC was informed that VC were in the C-47/helicopter area and that Air Policemen posted as close-in security guards were firing on them. An MD-3 power unit parked adjacent to an RF-101C in revetment Number 7 exploded in flame and the fire soon engulfed a major portion of the aircraft. It was initially assumed that this revetment had sustained a direct hit by a mortar; subsequent investigation, however, indicates that the explosion was in all probability caused by a grenade. One or more Viet Cong with this group raked a 180-degree area with automatic weapon fire while tossing handgrenades into the C-47/helicopter parking area. There were several large explosions at this time as fuel cells on one helicopter erupted; and grenades or 60mm mortar shells found other aircraft targets. The one VC who broke off from the main body proceeded south-west, down taxiway W-7, tossing hand grenades into unoccupied sand-bag personnel shelters. Before he could grenade an occupied bunker, the VC was killed by an Air Policeman armed with a shotgun.

(a) VC within the C-47/helicopter ramp-area halted their eastward movement several meters west of the ARMCO RF-4C revetments, hesitated, and then withdrew, retracing their entry route at 0140. Their hesitation may have been due to the heavy fire they were drawing at the time, and the resistance they would have to overcome to gain entry into the revetments. One Air Policeman at this location was firing tracer rounds from his M-16 which the VC may have mistaken for a machine gun.

(3) Throughout this time explosions were occurring sporadically within areas in which USAF helicopters, C-47s and USN aircraft were parked. The Counter-Mortar Radar Unit (CMR) reported at 0115 to TSN/SA a mortar position firing toward the base from XS 8185/98580, a location approximately 150 meters north-west of the 055 gate. An ARVN 105mm Howitzer positioned on Tan Son Nhut fired twenty-one rounds at this location. At 0315 the CMR unit plotted a mortar location at XS 791.985, approximately 100 meters north of the Vinatexco Textile Mill west of the base. (s) Assault helicopters of the 120th Aviation Battalion and VNAF A-1Hs were directed to this target. Elements of the 53rd RF Bn were enroute to the area when they were ambushed by the VC in the vicinity of coordinate XS 787/963 where two men were KIA and the reaction force scattered. The US Army Advisor to this unit reported to TSN/SA that while enroute to the factory location this force had been pursued by VC. Elements of the 53rd Bn did reach the factory area by 0200. (e)