

VC-1

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OPR 1034			
(C)	(DOP)	DP	(DI)
(DO)	(DMS)	DPL	CPT
DCE	DE	IG	(DOI)
CH	GPTD	DAS	SG
JA	PARC	(DCCP)	GMF
ISI	IWW	COMM	
DORC	6005	DOPE	R
			31/1

NNNNCZOKMCL19ZOKR0333  
 PP RUHLKM  
 DE RUMSBJ 38A 345051Z  
 ZNY 00000  
 P 110203Z DEC 66  
 FM 7AF TAN SON NHUT AB RVN  
 TO RUEFHQA/USAF  
 INFO RUHLKM/CINOPACAF

423 DEC 12 66

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CONFIDENTIAL ICSL 64130 DEC 66. FOR CSAF (AFISP-5), PACAF (IGSL), SUBJ (U) ATTACK ON TAN SON NHUT 4-5 DEC 1966 THIS MESSAGE IN TEN PARTS, PART I, (U) THIS REPORT IS FURNISHED PER REQUEST OF PACAF (IGSL) AND IS BASED UPON THE BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO DATE. MUCH INFORMATION IS YET TO BE ACQUIRED AND EVALUATED BEFORE WE CAN RECONSTRUCT WHAT HAPPENED WITH COMPLETE CONFIDENCE. PART II, (C) INITIAL INTERROGATION OF THREE OF THE VC PRISONERS CAPTURED (SEE DO 50 ROI 1 655 0347 66, 7DEC 66) REVEALED THAT THE ATTACKING FORCE CONSISTED OF 3 PLATOONS. PLATOONS 1 AND 2 BATTALION 6 CONSISTING OF 36 AND 22 MEN RESPECTIVELY, WERE DESIGNATED AS SUPPORT UNITS. PLATOON 2 OF UNIT V6, CONSISTING OF 30 MEN PLUS TWO FENCE CUTTERS AND TWO MINE HANDLERS, WAS THE ASSAULT PLATOON. UPON ARRIVAL AT THE WEST PERIMETER OF THE BASE AT ABOUT 2400 HOURS, 3 DEC 66, THE ASSAULT PLATOON CUT THROUGH THREE BARBED WIRE FENCES OF THE VNAF PERIMETER AND ENTERED

*print from 6/27*



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 THE BASE FOLLOWED BY A FEW MEMBERS OF THE SUPPORT PLATOONS.  
 PART III, (C) THE POINT OF ENTRY WAS APPROXIMATELY 800 YARDS NE FROM THE WEST END OF RUNWAY 25. ONCE INSIDE THE BASE THE VC ADVANCED TO A POINT ABOUT 1300 YARDS EAST OF THE ENTRY POINT AND ESTABLISHED A 60 MM MORTAR POSITION. THENCE THEY PROCEEDED ABOUT 200 YARDS SE WHERE THEY MADE CONTACT WITH A2C BEVICH, GEORGE H., JR., A SENTRY DOG HANDLER. BOTH AIRMAN BEVICH AND HIS DOG WERE KILLED. AIRMAN BEVICH WAS THE FIRST TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE ENEMY AND ALERT CSC. THIS ACTION OCCURRED ABOUT 0100 HOURS, 4 DEC 66. THE VC THEN MOVED ON SE ACROSS THE RUNWAY TO A POINT JUST EAST OF TAXIWAY N-5. AT THIS POINT THEY WERE ENGAGED BY AN AIR POLICE M-60 MACHINE GUN POSITION AND 13 VC WERE KILLED. AT LEAST ONE OF THE ATTACKING GROUP WAS ABLE TO GET ONTO THE WEST AIRCRAFT PARKING RAMP WHERE HE WAS KILLED BY AN AIR POLICE SENTRY.  
 PART IV, (C) THE AIR POLICE SQUADRON WAS MOBILIZED AS WELL AS THE USARV QUICK REACTION FORCE (TASK FORCE 35). TASK FORCE 35 CONSISTS OF APPROXIMATELY 125 SPECIAL TROOPS, I.E., CLERKS, COOKS, DRIVERS, ETC., WHO ARE ON CALL EACH NIGHT. TASK FORCE 35 IS UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE AIR FORCE WHEN IT IS EMPLOYED ON BASE. TASK FORCE 35 AND A PART OF THE AIR POLICE SQUADRON TOOK UP STATIC

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BLOCKING POSITIONS EXTENDING AROUND THE WEST END OF RUNWAY 25 AND  
RUNNING NORTHEAST ALONG THE WESTERN PERIMETER FOR APPROXIMATELY 1400  
YARDS. AN AIR POLICE FORCE INITIATED A SWEEP IN THE VICINITY OF

THE ENTRY POINT OF THE FENCE WAS GUT AND ENGAGED THE VC AT ABOUT  
0237 HOURS. THREE VC WERE KILLED IN THIS ACTION AS WELL AS TWO AIR  
POLITICIAN, A2C RIDDLE, OLIVER J., AND A2C GOLF, JOHN D. NEITHER OF  
THESE A-1H WERE DOG HANDLERS, BUT WERE MEMBERS OF THE QUICK  
REACTION FORCE. AT 2400 HOURS ALL AIR POLICE AND 15 PERSONNEL  
WERE FROZEN IN POSITION UNTIL DAYLIGHT TO PRECLUDE FIRING BETWEEN  
FRIENDLY FORCES. AT DAWN ANOTHER SWEEP WAS MADE AND ONE VC WAS  
KILLED AND 4 WERE CAPTURED, TWO OF WHICH WERE WOUNDED. ONE OF THE  
WOUNDED DIED IN THE HOSPITAL SOME TIME LATER. SEVERAL HOURS WERE  
SPENT SEARCHING THE AREA AFTER DAYLIGHT; HOWEVER, NO ADDITIONAL VC  
WERE FOUND. THE AREA IS LACED WITH DITCHES AND OLD WELLS. IT IS  
ALSO COVERED WITH THICK UNDERGROWTH 4 TO 6 FEET HIGH, APPARENTLY  
THE REMAINDER OF THE ATTACKING FORCE MANAGED TO HIDE IN THIS AREA  
AND AVOID DETECTION UNTIL ABOUT 2030 HOURS, 4 DEC 66, AT WHICH  
TIME A SENTRY DO TEAM DETECTED ONE OR MORE ABOUT 400 YARDS SOUTH  
OF THE ENTRY POINT IN THE FENCE. THE AIR POLICE SQUADRON WAS  
MOBILIZED, AGAIN TOOK UP STATIC POSITIONS ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF

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THE BASE AND INITIATED ANOTHER SWEEP OF THE AREA. BY 0030 HOURS,  
5 DEC JYVN THEY HAD MADE CONTACT WITH THE VC SEVERAL TIMES AND HAD  
KILLED 9 VC. NO FURTHER CONTACT WAS MADE UNTIL 1200 HOURS 5 DEC  
66 AT WHICH TIME ONE MORE VC WAS KILLED AT A POINT ABOUT 400 YARDS  
NORTH OF THE MIDPOINT OF RUNWAY 25. PART V. (C) IT WAS THOUGHT THAT  
DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF THE ATTACK STARTING AT ABOUT 0130  
HOURS, 4 DEC 66, THE VC HAD INITIATED A MORTAR ATTACK FROM A COUPLE  
POSITIONS OUTSIDE THE BASE; HOWEVER, THIS HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED. IT  
IS PROBABLE THAT AT LEAST FOUR ROUNDS WERE FIRED FROM THE  
POSITION ON BASE AS A BASE PLATE AND FOUR EMPTY AND SIX FULL  
MORTAR ROUND CONTAINERS WERE FOUND AT THE POSITION. THE VC WHICH  
WERE KILLED AND CAPTURED HAD ANTI-TANK GRENADES AND GRENADE LAUNCHERS  
IN THEIR POSSESSION AND NO DOUBT MANY OF THE EXPLOSIONS WHICH  
WERE THOUGHT TO BE MORTAR ROUNDS WERE ACTUALLY ANTI-TANK GRENADES.  
THE VC ALSO SET OFF AN EXPLOSION IN THE VNAF AMMUNITION STORAGE  
AREA DESTROYING A CONNEX CONTAINER. THEY PLANTED SEVERAL OTHER  
EXPLOSIVES IN THIS AREA WHICH DID NOT GO OFF. PART VI. (C) NUMEROUS  
WEAPONS WERE CAPTURED PLUS AN ASSORTMENT OF MUNITIONS TO INCLUDE  
TEN B-40 ANTI-TANK GRENADES, SIX 60 MM MORTAR ROUNDS, 157 HORN AND STICK  
GRENADES OF VARIOUS TYPES AND APPROXIMATELY 1000 ROUNDS OF SMALL

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ARMS AMMUNITIONS. PART VII. (C) BOX 3042 AIR POLICE-3 KIA, 10  
WIA, 3 DOGS KIA, AND 1 DOG WIA. VC-28 KIA, 4 CAPTURED (2 OF WHICH  
WERE WOUNDED AND ONE OF WHICH DIED LATER). ALL ABOVE VC WERE KILLED  
OR CAPTURED BY AIR POLICE. PART VIII. (C) ALL TEN AIR POLICE  
WHO WERE WIA HAVE BEEN AWARDED THE PURPLE HEART. THEIR NAMES FOLLOW:  
A1C SHANAN, TOMMY N., K-9 HANDLER; A2C DAVIS, LYLE K., SCTY GUARD;  
A2C JANIAK, THADDEUS M., SCTY GUARD; A2C POOLE, TOMMY C., K-9  
HANDLER (WITH DOG); A3C SIMMONS, RUSSELL, SCTY GUARD. SSGT HABECKER,  
BARRY L., SCTY GUARD; A2C ARANT, WILBERT B., SCTY GUARD. A2C  
THRONEBURG, ROBERT A., (WITH DOG; A1C YONKI, JOSEPH R., TNG  
SECTION; TSGT ECKXES, ROBERT J., TNG SECTION. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR  
OTHER DECORATIONS ARE BEING PREPARED PRESENTLY. PART IX. (C)  
DAMAGE WAS LIMITED PRIMARILY TO AIRCRAFT AND VEHICLES. IT IS  
BELIEVED THAT MOST OF THE DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT WAS CAUSED BY MORTAR  
FIRE OR FIRE FROM GRENADE LAUNCHERS. NINE USAF AND US NAVY AIRCRAFT  
RECEIVED DAMAGES REQUIRING OVER 50 MANHOURS TO REPAIR AND NINE  
RECEIVED DAMAGES REQUIRING LESS THAN 50 MANHOURS TO REPAIR. FIVE  
AIR POLICE VEHICLES WERE DESTROYED, PROBABLY BY GRENADES. PART X.  
(U) DETAILED COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT WILL FOLLOW. GP-4  
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