

THIS CARD FILE WAS STARTED ON 17 JUNE 1969, WITH THE INTENTION OF HAVING SOMETHING TO REMEMBER THIS TOUR OF DUTY BY. THIS IS THE ACTUAL ACCOUNT OF THE PLACE, TIME, DATE, AND WHAT DAMAGE WAS REPORTED TO THIS BASE, TAN SON NHUT AB, RVN, BY THE VICTIMIZED BASE IT'SELF.

AIC THOMAS H. BELL III
377th Security Police Squadron
Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN

Phu Cat - 2337 Hours, 17 June 69

(1)

9 Impacts - 82mm mortar
18 WIA - 1 KIA - 1 Serious - All USAF
NCO Club - Direct Hit - Major Damage
Airman's Club - Direct Hit - Major Damage
5 Fuel Pumps - BMP - Light Damage
Airman Barracks - Moderat Damage - Security Police

Bien Hoa - 0056 Hours, 18 June 69

8 122mm Rockets
1 USAF WIA - Transported to Long Binh Hospital
Airman's Barracks 2900 Area - Moderate Damage
1 Air Shelter - Moderate Damage

Phan Rang - 0002 Hours, 19 June 69

(2)

Incoming Rounds - Possibly 82mm Mortar
Unknown Damage - No further Report

Tan Son Nhut - 0040 Hours, 19 June 69

Tango #1 reports - Mortar, 82mm, impacts 5 miles out
Range of 82mm mortar rounds - 4800 meters - less than 4 miles

Phan Rang - 2148 Hours, 20 June 1969
Report - SAFEWIND - No further Report

(3)

Bien Hoa - 1925 Hours, 20 June 1969
Report - SAFEWIND - No further Report

Tan

Tan Son Nhut - 0200 Hours, 22 June 1969

Tango #1 reports - 3 impacts 3 1/2 miles out near
the Receiver Site - Located West of TSN

21st June 1969 - 28 June 1969

Limited Activity

24 June 1969 - Fleku

Incoming rounds

Bien Hoa - 25 June 1969

Incoming Rounds - 32 122mm Rockets

(4)

Tan Son Nhut - 29 June 1969, 2210 Hours

(5)

Rockets Impacting On Base

100 Yards East of Delta Bunker #9

1 122mm Rocket Hit Approximately 200 Yards From Barracks

Rocket Left 6X12 Foot Hole

Alpha Bunker #11 - Machinegun Fire Toward Bunker

Victor #5 On Scene - Individuals Sighted In North Church

Machine gun fire ~~Fire~~ Came From Yellow House

(6)

Tan Son Nhut - 2345 Hours, 29 June 1969

All Quiet!

Bien Tuy - 16 July 1969

Incoming Rounds - SAFEWIND

Bien Tuy - 17 July 1969

Incoming Rounds - SAFEWIND

Saigon - 17 July 1969, 2310 Hours

(7)

Ground Attack and Impacting Rockets on Newport Bridge

Approximately 4 1/2 Miles From Tan Son Nhut

Saigon Also Taking Impacts Near Docks

Phu Cat - 2236 hours, 19 July 1969

Security Police Ambush Patrol Ambushed - 1 Grenade

2 Security Policeman WIA

Phan Rang - 2326 hours, 19 July 1969

(8)

8 82mm Mortars - Hit NE Perimeter - No Damage

No Casualties - Yellow Condition Assumed

INTELLIGENCE REPORT FOR 19 JULY 1969

1 Battalion of Enemy 2 1/2 Miles NE from Tan Son Nhut

Possible Rockets - NW from TSN - Army can't find them!

122mm Rkts - Known to be out there - They've Not Been

Fired YET! - Rockets 4 Miles Out - Chopper Contact NW

TSN, AB, RVN.

THE PEOPLE YOU NEVER HEARD ABOUT DURING THE BATTLE OF TAN SON NHUT AIR BASE, RVN. It was 0320 hours, 31 January 1968, when the first hostile act occurred against this command base on the outskirts of Saigon. Automatic weapons was being directed at the POL and CBPO area of the base, and the intense fire had pinned a SAT down which was on the outer perimeter road at that time. Minutes later on the opposite side of the base, the 051 Bunker and Gate were assaulted by an estimated three battalions of Main Force Viet Cong. The enemy used mortar, E-40 and RPG-7 rockets coupled with light and heavy machinegun fire to cover their assault. Within minutes these positions were overrun and the enemy was charging onto the base.

Quick Reaction Teams were dispatched immediately, and made heavy contact approximately a half mile east of the west perimeter. Simultaneously, the Joint General Staff Compound and the MACV Annex were assaulted by numerous companies of Main Force Viet Cong. Tracer fire and mortars were dropping all over the base and the compounds that were being attacked. Fire fights broke out within the main base area....the enemy had infiltrated snipers the day before. With the aid of a Light Fire Team, the Security Police, some 150 strong (on the west perimeter), managed to stop the attacking force which was attempting to overrun the entire base. Advance, hold, counter-attack and hold was the theme of the hour as the Security Police battled the enemy in fierce engagements.

Several hours after the initial penetration of the base perimeter the Vietnamese Airborne, who were fighting on their south perimeter, managed to send two companies to assist the Security Police in their battle which almost came to hand to hand combat. Flanking the attacking force the combined friendly forces launched a counter-attack which was met with a withering hail of mortars, rockets and heavy machinegun fire.

Interim After Actions Report (U)

7AF (IGS)

1. Reference Telecom between Lt Colonel Barr, Director of Security Police, Hq 7AF, and Lt Colonel Garred and Lt Colonel Carter, Chief, 377th Security Police, 377th CSG, the following information is submitted. Information contained in this document has been compiled from data presently available and has been coordinated with the Senior Advisor, Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area, and the Vietnamese Defense Force Commander of Tan Son Nhut Air Base (Major C Chieu, RVN).
2. At 0320hrs, 31 January 1968, Tan Son Nhut AB received heavy ground-to-ground automatic weapons fire off the east perimeter. The fire appeared to be directed at the POL Storage Area and the east aircraft parking ramp. Since this unit, as a part of 7AF, was already in Condition Red by order of the 7AF Commander, reaction forces were alerted and directed to stand-by. Automatic weapons fire directed on to the base was reported at the south and west perimeter. At 0333hrs., E-6(a U.S. manned perimeter defensive bunker on the west perimeter) reported that grenades and B-40 rockets were being directed towards the west perimeter of the base, but were falling short. At 0334hrs., the same position reported that they had observed approximately 25 individuals just east of the fence line 100 meters west of the perimeter fence.
3. At 0340hrs., E-6 reported that he had been hit and the B-40 rockets were exploding on base. By this time, reserve units previously alerted and in stand-by status had been dispatched and were assuming a holding defensive line at approximately 70 meters east of the perimeter fence, stretching south to north from the high speed taxiway to RW #25R.
4. At 0344hrs., E-6 reported that the Viet Cong had taken and broken through the west perimeter adjacent to the 051 gate. Enemy forces were taken under fire by responding Security Alert Teams, Reserve Security Alert Teams, Quick Reaction TEAMS (13 man Security Police Reserve units made up of off-duty personnel), and U.S. Army augmentation forces to the Security Police Squadron from Task Force 35. (Total U.S. holding forces of approximately 155 personnel).
5. Through the Joint Defense Operations Center, three ARVN Tanks, U.S. Army armed helicopters, and 105mm artillery were directed to the scene and engaged the Viet Cong. The helicopters continuously assaulted the enemy inside the perimeter fence from the rear and left flank(south) of the holding line. The Joint Defense Operations Center requested and received reinforcements from General Warem, IIFC Commander on the scene. The first unit to arrive was "C" Troop, 3 Squad, 4th Cavalry. They were employed in a flanking movement from the north and attacked the enemy exploitation force just outside the perimeter. This attack enabled the Defense units countering the penetration to mount an internal counter attack and reestablish the perimeter.

6. Heavy fighting continued and at 0630hrs., a Security Police Tower reported that the VC were withdrawing. At 0635hrs., the U.S. Forces assault line was withdrawn about 50 meters to the east to align the two companies of the VNAF Airborne to prepare for a counterattack "sweep and destroy" to the west perimeter. The friendly holding and assault line was now subjected to intense B-40 rocket barrages from off-base positions. All during the heavy contact, the base was constantly subjected to small arms and automatic weapons fire from the south and the east.

7. At 0729 hours, part of an armored cavalry troop from the 25th Infantry Division moved to the 051 gate to seal the breached fence line. Heavy firing continued within the perimeter while the combined U.S. and VN assault line pushed through to the perimeter. The assault line, U.S. and VN tanks and armed helicopters continued exchanging heavy fire with the enemy until 1117 hours, 31 January 1968. The E-6 bunker, when overrun early in the assault, was occupied by the Viet Cong. The enemy had turned the U.S. M-60 machine gun in the bunker onto the counter-attacking forces and were holding back the friendly forces. The bunker was assaulted by armed helicopters, armored and ground forces before it was resecured. Upon completion of securing the bunker, the counter-assault was continued and the friendly forces advanced to the perimeter road line, secured their area and held defensive positions. The entire area was swept and declared free of living enemy. Defensive line positions were established to secure the breached west perimeter. From this point until the present, there have been no further breaches on the installation perimeter fence. Continued incidents of enemy sniper fire, automatic weapons firing, and hostile harassment fire directed onto the installation have been experienced. Many of these incidents have been engaged by the Security Police. Heavy through light enemy contact around the base perimeter has also been continuing.

8. At this point, it is apparent that the assault on Tan Son Nhut AB was conducted by the 271st Regiment of the 9th Viet Cong Division (Main Force). The estimated strength of this initial assaulting regiment was 600. The regiment reportedly was trained in Cambodia, and is estimated to have been on the move for four months. The unit was well equipped, and its weaponry included, but was not limited to:

- A. B-40 Rockets
- B. PG-7 Rockets
- C. 57 Recoilless Rifles
- D. RKG-3T Grenades
- E. Large assortment of hand and stick grenades
- F. Claymore Mines
- G. Satchel Charges
- H. Blocked TNT

- I. 50 Cal Machine Guns
- J. 30 Cal Machine Guns
- K. M-16 A-1 Rifles
- L. AK-47 Rifles
- M. AK-50 Rifles
- N. 30 Cal Carbines
- O. 75 Recoilles Rifles

9. Reliable intelligence information indicates that the 271st Regiment of the 9th Viet Cong Division was to completely overrun and secure Tan Son Nhut AB as an integral portion of the massive offensive against the Gia Dinh Province. The Tan Son Nhut AB complex was under siege by an estimated 12-15 enemy battalions with an estimated strength of 2000-2500 personnel. The overall operation plan indicated that, after the breach of the west perimeter was accomplished, the enemy was to pass through the perimeter from all sides, organize and move on to MACV Headquarters Compound and 7AF Headquarters Compound, overrun and secure them. Indications are that the method of operation was to accomplish these objectives while inflicting only minor damages to the facilities and property which they planned to possess.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

BILLY J. CARTER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Chief, Security Police

1Atch
Pertinent Statistical
Information

PERTINENT STATISTICAL INFORMATION

U.S. CASUALTIES

KIA

USAF - 4 (Security Police)

Army - 18

WIA

USAF - 11

Army - 33

VN CASUALTIES

KIA

VNAF - 0

ARVN - 29

WIA

VNAF - 2

ARVN - 11+

ENEMY CASUALTIES

INSIDE PERIMETER

OUTSIDE PERIMETER

KIA (Body Count)

157

500+

Captured

2

12+

AIRCRAFT DAMAGED/DESTROYED

USAF

TYPE

Lightly Damaged

Destroyed

AC47

9

0

C47

1

0

C54

1

0

C117

2

0

H43

1

0

Total 14

0

VNAF aircraft did not sustain damage.

STRUCTURAL DAMAGE

4 Conexes of paint burned (total loss)

1 Trailer van burned (total loss)

1 Trailer house burned (total loss)

1 Shed roof damaged (repairable)

RUNWAY DAMAGE

3' x 1' x 3" impact hole. Runway remained operational.

Atch 1

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 377 Supply Sqdn (SUPSXE)

10 Feb 68

SUBJECT: Explosive Items Recovered

TO: GSC

1. The following is a list of explosive items recovered by the EOD team from 30 Jan to 2 Feb 68 as a result of the attack on TSN AB, RVN:

- 22 - VC booby traps (locally Fabricated)
- 8 - VC DHB claymore mines
- 12 - VC DH 10 claymore mines
- 37 - Chicom B40 rockets(motors)
- 84 - Chicom B40 rockets
- 38 - USSR PG-7 rockets
- 103 - Chicom RKG-3TG grenades
- 95 - VC stick grenades
- 40 - VC home made grenades
- 13 - VC plastic explosive charges
- 142 - Chicom TNT blocks
- 17 - VC demo kits - stachel charge
- 12000 - Rds Chicom 7.62 intermediate ammo
- 2000 - Rds Chicom 7.62 rimmed ammo
- 44 - US 4.2 HE
- 5 - US 81mm mortar, HE
- 13 - US 81mm mortar, illuminating
- 14 - US 90mm HE
- 45 - US M26 grenades
- 5 - US M34 WP grenade
- 65 - US 40mm grenade
- 31 - US M18 smoke grenade
- 19 - US claymore
- 27 - US flare, M127A1
- 5 - US 57mm recoilless
- 17 - US 75mm HE
- 15 - US 20mm HE
- 47 - Rds US 50 Cal ammo
- 15000 - US 7.62 ammo
- 12000 - US 5.56 ammo
- 1200 - US 45 cal ammo
- 7 - US MK 24 para flare
- 12 - US 90mm canister rounds

JAMES L HAYNES, Capt, USAF
OIC, SEA Mobile EOD Team

FROM: Golf 3 SAT Ldr, C Flt Scty, 377th SPS

11 February 1968

SUBJECT: Pre & Post Atk Rpt (31 Jan 68, TSNAB, RVN)

TO: Commander, C Flight Security

1. The following is a brief report of Pre & Post attack activities of Golf 3 Security Alert Team

a. Members: Sgt Billups, John C., AF14 [REDACTED] (Machinegunner)

ALC Underwood, R. E., AF25 [REDACTED] (Rider)

b. Assigned Area: Tango 17 to 056 Gate on the Northeast perimeter

c. At approximately 0310 hours, 31 Jan 68 (tour of duty started at 1800 hours, 30 Jan 68), while patrolling the Northeast outer perimeter road, my SAT came under heavy tracer fire approximately 15 meters North of the 2nd Service Battalion bunker PD2A. This incoming fire was from an automatic weapon position directly North of my location and approximately 50 meters out from the perimeter fence. The fire was being directed at my position, the POL Tank Farm, CBPO area and the C-130 revements.

d. At approximately 0312 hours I notified CSC of the situation.

e. At approximately 0317 hours Captain DeNisio, Wpns Sys Scty Ops Officer, and 1st Lt Grover, C Flt Scty Comdr, arrived at my location and I briefed them on the situation. I was directed to hold my position, then Captain DeNisio and Lt Grover departed to the West on the outer perimeter road.

f. At approximately 0322 hours I overheard on the SP radio that the Viet Cong were assualting and penetrating the 051 Bunker and 051 Gate to my West.

g. At approximately 0325 hours my SAT and I heard heavy explosions and automatic weapons fire coming from the vicinity of the MACV Annex. Also at this time I could see mortar rounds impacting approximately 150 meters to my North in the hamlet.

h. At approximately 0330 hours we could see the mortars being walked in from the hamlet to our North. Still heavy automatic weapons fire in the MACV Annex. Small arms fire being directed at our position again.

i. At approximately 0335 hours I decided to relocate the position of my SAT, as we were in the "V" of the perimeter road and there was no protection whatsoever. I moved my team to the PD2A Bunker, approximately 15 meters to our East, on the outer perimeter road. I left my jeep on the road as it was impossible to get to it due to the fire.

j. At approximately 0350 hours we were still receiving light fire from several positions off base. I made good contact with the two ARVN troops at the bunker and they explained to me that they expected the enemy to infiltrate the Northeast perimeter. Based on this information and the sound of approaching mortar fire I decided to remain at this bunker and not to return to the inner perimeter road.

k. 0415 hours we could hear grenade explosions off the East perimeter. Tracer fire still very heavy at the MACV Annex. Mortar rounds still impacting in the hamlet to our North.

l. At approximately 0620 hours I decided that no threat of a ground penetration existed on the Northeast perimeter so I pulled my SAT out and returned to the inner perimeter road. Enroute to the inner perimeter we received several rounds of sniper fire. Prior to pulling out I noticed that the civilians who lived in the house next to PD2A had come out and either did not seem to know what was happening or did not care what was happening.

m. Between approximately 0700 hours and 1100 hours my SAT and I checked SP posts, patrolled the inner perimeter road and responded to numerous calls from SP posts reporting sniper fire. Heavy mortar and automatic weapons fire could be seen in the MACV Annex area and off the East perimeter.

n. At approximately 2100 hours my SAT was dispatched to the Civilian Air Terminal to check out a reported sniper with an automatic weapon. Upon arrival my team was brought under fire by the sniper and we engaged same. Several minutes later I pulled my team out of the area because we had no radio comm with other SP units who were also engaging the enemy. On the scene were two other SATs, Terminal Security and VN Civilian Police. I returned to normal patrol.

o. At approximately 0200 hours, 1 February, my SAT responded to Tango 14 who was reported by CSC to have been pinned down by snipers. I drove the inner perimeter road as far as the 79th Compound where we were pinned down by heavy automatic weapons fire from the 056 gate. As I could neither advance or withdrawal I notified CSC of this and was directed to stay put until I could get out.

p. At approximately 0240 hours the firing at the 056 gate was light enough to where I decided to move out to Alpha Post 8, and to Tango 14. Enroute to Tango 14 we received moderate sniper as was confirmed by the sentry on Alpha Post 15 who stated that he could see numerous tracer rounds being directed at my jeep as we passed the 056 Gate.

q. At approximately 0300 hours, 3 February, my SAT responded to Tango 15 to investigate a reported sniper. Shortly thereafter we received fire from the suspected position and returned same.

r. At approximately 0400 hours Tango 15 reported moderate sniper fire from the same position. Bravo 1 SAT, TSGT Hurley and my SAT responded to the post and assaulted the position which resulted in the burning of the suspected position (a house, two story) and possible killing of two VC. Numerous secondary explosions came from the burning house...Possible small arms ammunition and grenades.

s. At approximately 0430 hours, 4 February Tango 16 reported a sniper position to the East of his post. Bravo 1 and my SAT responded and assaulted the position which resulted in the burning of three houses, numerous large explosions (possible grenades and B-40 rockets), and a reported body count of twenty (+) enemy.

t. During the evening of 5 February my SAT responded to the Air Vietnam hanger to investigate a reported sniper. Together our teams, Golf 2, checked the area with negative results.

u. At approximately 2200 hours, 7 February my SAT escorted four US Army officers from the 056 gate to the Joint General's Staff Compound (JGS) which is located 100 meters South of the 3rd Field Hospital, Saigon.

2. During the period 30 January 1968 to 11 February 1968 I was the assigned leader of Golf 3 Security Alert Team. During this period I witnessed Sgt Billups and ALC Underwood perform their duties in a most commendable and dedicated manner. Not once did they hesitate to seek out snipers or subject themselves to enemy fire so as to locate the origin of the fire.

CHRISTOPHER M. GODFREY, SGT, USAF
Golf 3 SAT Leader