Here are the events of 5/6 Jan 1967 attack on Pleiku AB.
I was a strike team leader for "C"
flight, 633rd Security Police Squadron, Pleiku AB, the night of 5/6
Jan 1967. Somewhere around 0130 hours, our ARVN outpost out from the
bomb dump on the North perimeter was overrun by the VC and 4 ARVN's
were killed. The VC cut the wire right in front of the machine gun post
and took it from the ARVN guard who was apparently sleeping. The VC
threw many hand grenades in to the outpost huts where soldiers, women
and children were living. Fortunately many did not explode.
Two Spooky birds scrambled right away. They
were really burning up the ramp past us to get to the runway for a quick
take off. The VC then began mortaring Pleiku AB from our own outpost.
The incoming was being directed at the bomb dump and the aircraft revetment
areas.
There was a Security Police strike team in
our bomb dump led by SSgt Gingrich. Another SSgt and I were just west
of Base Operations and the North perimeter fence line when the incoming
began. Gingrich picked up the mortar flashes immediately. He began pouring
machine gun fire in to the mortar emplacements in the outpost.
There were 3 dog men on the perimeter fence.
They got in to the same perimeter bunker and also began firing at the
outpost. They quickly ran out of ammunition and called for resupply.
(A side note. The dogs never attacked
any of the dog men in the bunker nor fought among themselves all the
time they were in the bunker together. Have never been able to figure
that one out.)
A squad member, A2C Brown, picked up two canisters
of ammo. He ran down along the North perimeter fence to get the ammo
to them. He was getting fired upon. Where the fire was coming from,
I do not know. He made it safely to resupply the dog men in the bunker.
Another one of my squad members, "Lurch"
(A1C Fred Krisch,
VSPA Member), was manning a perimeter bunker on the North perimeter
and he opened fire with the machine gun. Flight Cdr, MSgt William Welch,
was directing Krisch's machine gun fire.
At II Corps Headquarters, Artillery Hill began
to fire at the VC positions.* If I remember
correctly, there were between 7 and 14 artillery rounds fired that night.
We were taking rounds in the bomb dump before someone looked at the
grid coordinates and called the artillery support off. We were later
informed the VC had gotten on our landlines and called our own artillery
in on us.
SSgt Gingrich was seriously hurt when he tried
to get out of the bomb dump during the mortaring and shelling. He was
on one of the ammo storage mounds. He forgot where he was and ran off
the top of the mound and fell 10-12 feet, seriously hurting his back.
With the shelling going on, no one was able to go help him. He did suffer
serious back injuries that caused him to be relieved from duty for quite
awhile.
Spooky was now airborne real quickly, and
began illumination. They reported they had the enemy spotted and wanted
to open fire with the gattling guns. TSgt Roy Clark, C Flight Assistant
Flight Cdr., was working in CSC. He gave the order to open fire. MSgt
Welch picked up the transmission and refused them permission because
of the friendly forces trying to escape from the outposts. Also, there
was a very grave danger the North and East areas of the air base would
be sprayed. There were many security police and augmentees deployed
in that area, plus other base personnel scrambling to safety.
At
the same time the VC overran our outpost, they attacked the army helicopter
base at Camp Holloway and blew up the fuel dump. Holloway was able to
get the choppers in the air and they began white phosphorus rocket strafing
runs along the Northeast and East perimeters of Pleiku AB, the only
possible exit route for the VC.
During the attack, the base commander came
on the radio and informed MSgt Welch he had two Hobos (A1Es) low on
fuel that he had to get down. There were no other bases in the area
where they could be diverted to before running out of fuel. He asked
Welch if the incoming rounds and fire were suppressed enough to let
the A1E's land. Welch let him know it was okay for them to come on in.
They landed safely.
The mortar fire subsided and we remained on
continuous alert until daylight when patrols began to sweep the area.
No dead VC were found nor none captured in the outpost or perimeter
sweep.
The return fire by SSgt Gingrich, the dog
men and A1C Krisch, prevented a VC penetration to get to the revetments
where the A1E's were parked and blow them up.
We were on the sweep of the revetment areas, supply yards and adjacent
areas after daylight.
A large number of casualties from Camp Holloway
soon began arriving after daylight and were being loaded on two C-130's
for MED-EVAC.
One of our spotter planes was working a ways
out from the East perimeter and called in that he had VC spotted. He
was dropping markers to let us know where they were. We had SP's patrolling
in that area and they began a search. They were able to locate the markers,
but unable to find the enemy.
There was one comical event that came out
of the sweep. SSgt John K. Gill was in that sweep off the East perimeter
and we lost contact with him. There was an immediate search and they
soon found him. He was stuck in the mud and unable to free himself.
He somehow lost his radio and was unable to contact anyone for help.
He was lifted out the mud, but the whereabouts of the radio is unknown
to this day.
We finally ceased operations and were relieved
by the day shift. I can remember a group of us going to NCO Club on
Artillery Hill for breakfast. The adrenaline was really still flowing
in all of us and all of us were still shaking quite a bit. Some were
on the verge of tears (including me) elated about the fact that we came
out of that attack alive!
After 36 years, this is all I can remember
about 5/6 Jan 67.
BEN BARTO, SMSgt, USAF (Retired)
* Attempts to
have US artillery and navy forces fire upon itself by English speaking
VC/NVA are documented for Pleiku AB, Jan 1967 as follows:
[Courtesy of http://asa.npoint.net/cll64.htm]
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222
MAC J343 15 September 1967
SUBJECT: Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned No. 64:
3.(CMHA) VC/NVA ICD ATTEMPTS TO GAIN
INFORMATION:
a. A radio operator, station call LITTLE
JOE ALFA, received a voice transmission in English from station LIMELIGHT
requesting a communications check and asked what time the helicopters
were departing in the morning. LITTLE JOE ALFA replied "0730".
After checking his schedule the LITTLE JOE ALFA operator found he was
in error on the time and called LIMELIGHT to correct the error. The
LIMELIGHT operator reported that the LIMELIGHT transmitter had not been
used during the night and that he had made no such request. Two days
later the bogus LIMELIGHT station again requested operation- al information.
On this occasion LITTLE JOE ALFA requested authentication and the bogus
station was unable to comply.
b. Two attempts to gain information
using telephone taps were made at Camp Holloway, Pleiku in January 1967
as follows:
(1) The caller speaking in excellent
English with a slight Spanish accent called all the bunkers and
stated, "Hot food is being prepared for the men in the guard bunkers.
How many men are there in each bunker and how many bunkers are there?"
One of the bunkers started to answer when a guard at another bunker
broke in stating, "don’t answer! If that’s Vega (the
commander of the relief) he should know how many men and bunkers. "
The caller broke off transmission. A check was made with SP4 Vega and
found that he had not made the call. The people in the bunkers, however,
felt the caller’s voice sounded exactly like Vega’s and that
the caller must have been very adept at imitation.
(2) At bunker number one in the POL
yard a telephone caller, speaking in fluent English, reported that
food was coming down shortly, wanted to know which bunker this was and
how many men were in it. The guard at bunker one answered him. The guard
became suspicious, however, when the caller asked how many men were
in the other bunkers and the caller hung up. The guard called the commander
of the relief to verify the previous call and was told that no such
call had been made. A check of the telephone line leading to bunker
number one revealed that someone had tapped the line.
c. Two additional deception attempts
were made by telephone at Camp Holloway when a caller impersonated
a SFC assigned to post headquarters. The caller identified himself on
both occasions and spoke in a clear normal conversation tense and speed.
He attempted to have the Sergeant of the Guard post one man on top of
each bunker in the defense perimeter and to have the perimeter lights
turned off. The text of the message did not appear to be prepared speech
for when asked several questions, his response was reasonable and undisturbed
indicat- ing a thorough command of the language. The attempted ruse
did not work, however, because in each case the Officer of the Day was
notified. The SFC concerned was in the mess hall at the time of each
call and stated that he did not place the calls.
d. A US Navy ship on Market Time
received a radio message over Fleet Common from a station identifying
itself as an aircraft with a possible fire mission at coordinates
975228 (no letters given). The only audible portion of the station’s
call sign were the digits 098. The station transmitted again asking
(in English with oriental accent) "Are you a Market Time patrol
ship?’ The transmission was not understood and the station repeated
the question. The ship replied "Roger wait out". The ship
attempted to contact 098 five times to ask for authentication but 098
failed to respond.
