Additional Information About The Accident:
Department of The Air Force
Headquarters, Thirteenth Air Force
APO San Francisco 96274
16 May 1968
Subject: Report of Explosives Accident
To: (Various Agencies)
(SAFETY)
1. The following is a resume of a recent explosives
accident which occurred in a munitions storage area and involved M-fl7
bombs in their shipping configuration:
a. The Initial Explosion
At approximately 2100, a munitions crew consisting
of qualified munitions personnel went to a barricaded aboveground
magazine in the Munitions Storage Area. Their task for the night was
to remove M-117 bombs from their shipping pallets and place these
bombs on dunnage. The crew consisted of five airmen and one was
assigned the task of driving a RT forklift that would be used to lift
the bombs off their shipping pallets. Two were assigned the task of
removing the empty wooden shipping pallets after the bombs had been
lifted from them, and two were to perform the task of positioning on
4" x 4" wooden dunnage the bombs lifted by the RT forklift.
The crew entered the revetment. A liteall NF-2, was started to provide
illumination. After positioning the necessary dunnage, the crew
proceeded through the use of approved Standard Operating Procedures.
The operation started at the East end of a row of five stacks of
palletized bombs. One airman drove in with the RT forklift and picked
up a single bomb on top of stack 1 (numbering from the East). He
backed up and after the pallet was removed, picked up the two bombs on
the second level of stack 1. This gave him three bombs on the forks of
the RT forklift. This was considered a normal load for the forklift.
The airman drove the forklift around to where two airmen were ready to
receive the bombs and place them on dunnage. After placing the bombs
on the dunnage, the forklift returned to the East end of the row of
stacks of palletized bombs to get three more bombs. The forklift then
picked the 2 bombs off the top of stack 2 and began to back out in
preparation for picking up one of the bombs that was on the remaining
pallet in stack 1. When the forklift was approximately 15 feet East of
the row of stacks of bombs, two of the airmen saw the top pallet of
stack 5 (West end of row) begin to tilt. When the tilt of the pallet
reached approximately 10 degrees from the horizontal, a low order
detonation occurred. This fact was confirmed by two airmen in separate
statements taken before they had a chance to discuss events. The time
of the initial detonation was 2125 local. THE BOMBS IN QUESTION WERE
IN THE SHIPPING CONFIGURATION (NO BOOSTERS, BANDED TO SHIPPING PALLET,
NOZE AND TAIL PLUGS INSTALLED) AND WERE NOT BEING HANDLED IN ANY
MANNER. The explosion was described as a fireball which rapidly
enveloped the bombs. This explosion knocked two airmen to the ground
and temporarily, partially blinded and deafened them, but shortly
after this explosion, they ran over the revetment wall. The forklift
driver was either knocked off his forklift by the explosion or jumped
off while stunned by the concussion, but he evacuated the revetment by
running out the East opening. Two airmen who were approximately 10
feet from the explosion when it occurred were seriously injured at
this time and were unable to leave the revetment. As a result of the
explosion there were fires set throughout the revetment. The liteall
and the coleman tractor attached to it were set on fire. The
palletized bombs were partially scattered. The pallets were burning.
Grass fires were started on all the walls. Dunnage was ignited and
there were pieces of burning HE thrown throughout the revetment.
b. The Second Explosion
At the same time in the vicinity of the munition
storage area office, at the Security Police guard shack there were
five Security Policemen and four Thai guards. The Security Police
present were members of two SAT (Security Alert Team) teams and one
gate guard. At 2125 all personnel noticed a muffled explosion. One Air
Policeman shouted to another that there was a fire in the area and
that a crew was working in the general vicinity of where the fire was
located. Calls were made in request of emergency vehicles and the Air
Policemen responded to the fire. On arrival they saw fires
encompassing the liteall and coleman tractor, the grass on the
revetment walls, the bomb dunnage, the pallets the bombs had been
resting on prior to the first explosion, and small intense fires
scattered throughout the interior of the revetment. They also saw two
individuals inside the revetment. One was lying in a burning area, the
other was crawling about evidently not being able to tell where he was
headed. The Air Policemen began to shout and the crawling individual
responded and came towards them. As he came out of the revetment, they
caught him and put out fires that were still burning on his body. An
Air Policeman ran into the revetment, grabbed two buckets of water
from the revetment fire barrel, ran to the individual who was lying in
the burning area, and doused this individual with water. At this
point, another Air Policeman ran into the revetment to assist and they
carried the individual to the fire barrel which they tipped over on
him to extinguish fires that were burning on his body. He was placed
behind the East revetment wall and an Air Policeman volunteered to
stay with him. Seven minutes had elapsed from the time of the first
detonation. At 2132 there was a high order detonation. The two airmen
by the East revetment wall died at this time. All other personnel were
stunned and suffered temporary partial blinding and deafness.
Shrapnel, exposed HE, and unexploded bombs were throughout the area.
The remaining personnel were met by ambulances and other emergency
vehicles. During the night, there occurred two low order detonations.
These consisted of one M-117 bomb each time. The area had been secured
and there was no further injuries. The times on the low order
detonations were 0335 and 01415.
c. The Investigation
The same night, at approximately 2300, statements
were taken from all other personnel involved in the accident and a
survey of the area in and around the revetment was started. This
survey included an EOD cleanup of the area. Distribution of fragments
of HE, intact bombs, and shrapnel was plotted on an area map. Pictures
of the damage were taken from a helicopter. Orders were published
appointing a formal accident investigating board. The lot numbers of
the bombs involved were identified and a random sample of remaining
bombs of the suspected lot numbers was taken and held for
investigation. A 100% inspection of these lot numbers was carried out
without any visible defects being found.
A re-enactment of the events leading up to the
incident was carried out in a revetment in the Munitions Storage Area.
Two of the personnel who were in the revetment at the time of the
original occurrence guided the operation.
The board determined there was no fire prior to the
initial detonation. The two eyewitnesses had a clear view of the bombs
in question. The liteall and coleman tractor were also in open view
and a flash fire at either piece of equipment could not be mistaken
for a detonation in the area of the bombs.
The initial detonation was a low order detonation
consisting: of two M-117 GP 750 lb bombs that occurred at 2125 local.
The detonation started in one bomb on the pallet in question and
probably propagated to the other M-117 on the pallet. The second
detonation was a high order detonation that occurred at 2132 local.
This detonation was a direct result of the initial detonation and was
caused by the burning HE and the fire that resulted from the initial
detonation.
2. The exact cause of this accident is unknown. A
suspected cause was identified and is being reviewed by responsible
commanders in their through channels indorsements to the formal report
so it is not appropriate to comment on it in this letter.
FOR THE COMMANDER
ROBERT M. HANSEN, Colonel, USAF Inspector General
