CHAPTER I

Mission and Resources

1. (U) MISSION: The mission of the 35th Security Police Squadron is to defend Phan Rang Air Base, its Personnel and resources against hostile actions of any scope and nature; to provide liaison to and coordination with Allied forces charged with external defense; to provide weapons training as required for augmentee personnel; to insure that law and order is maintained and that discipline and security prevail.

2. (C) PERSONNEL RESOURCES:

COMMANDERS.

Chief Security Police	Lt Col Donald E. Reeves
Operations Officer	Maj William H. Powell, Jr.
Asst. Ops Officer	Capt Garth A. Wright
Security Ops Officer	Capt David La Bronn
Law Enforcement Officer	Capt John Re Mc Elhaney
Training/Supply Officer	Capt John P. Todd
ICC Coordinating Officer	lLt Albert C. Rock III
Asst. Security Ops Officer	1Lt Ronald E. White
First Sergeant	MSgt Walter De Boulier
NCOIC Operations	SMSgt Raymond Turner
NCOIC Security Operations	MSgt William B, Frazier
NCOIC ICC	TSgt Joseph E. Moore
NCOIC Law Enforcement	TSgt Glenn Re Osburn
NCOIC Training	SSgt James V. Smith

b. Key Personnel Changes

(1) On 6 January 69, 1Lt Albert C. Rock assumed duties as Coordinating Officer Installation Coordination Center (ICC), relieving Capt Jon M. Samuels who departed PCS to USAF/RAF Exchange Program, Catterick (England).

(2) On I March 69, Capt David La Bronn assumed duties as Security Operations officer relieving Capt Garth A. Wright, who assumed duties as Asst. operations officer prior to PCS departure to USAFE.

c. Personnel Wounded in Action

(1) 26 January 1969

• SSgt William W. Ileso
• SSgt Glenn R. Redmond
• Sgt Timothy M. Hunstiger
• Sgt Thomas J. Caputo
• Sgt Rafel Velasquez, Jr.
• AlC David E, Bezette

(2) 22 February 1969
• Sgt Ronald D. Logan
• AlC Leno Gudiry, Jr.
• AlC Rudy E. Garcia

d. Personnel Manning

(1) Authorized	Assigned
465 Enlisted	January 69	456 Enlisted
8 Officers		8 Officers
	February 69	448 Enlisted
		8 Officers
	March 69	395 Enlisted
		8 Officers

(2) The general atrophy in assigned strength during the quarter quickly became critical and required the daily employment of roughly 110 augmentee personnel from other unrelated career fields. At one point Security Police manning declined to such a level that 163 augmentees were required to defend the Air Base. A contributing factor to augmentee requirements was the necessity to operate in Security Alert Condition (SACON) Yellow, posture requiring greater than normal strength. SACON Yellow was initiated on 3 January 69 and was in effect for 69 days during the quarter. At times on a 24 hour schedule but more frequently during the critical hours from 1900 to 0700. The Yellow Alert Condition thus produced manpower strains on those squadrons contributing augmentees-as well as on the Security Police Squadron itself. The situation however, difficult as it was, was repeatedly justified during nine enemy attacks against the installation in which the augmentee program was thoroughly tested and proven in combat.

(3) The Security Police Personnel shortage produced also the undesirable necessity of involuntarily extending 47 February returnees until 25 February 69 and 12 March returnees until 15 March 69.

3. (C) RESOURCES EQUIPMENT:

(b) The Armory initiated an accelerated parts replacement and repair program in the M-12, M-15, M16, and M-2 weapons systems. The bench stock, parts acquisitions and reliability factors are all well above operational requirements.

(c) Acquisitions:

3 M-2 (3 retired)
2 Crew-served Starlite scopes (for M-2)
2 Individual Starlite scopes (for M16)
19 Battery Chargers (non-tactical radio)


(d) Weapons Inventory

Type	Number
M60	52
M5	10
M-79	9
M16	606
M-2 (.38)	184
CAR-15	71
M-12	25
XM-148	125

(e) Ammunition Expenditures

Type	Number
M5	500,000
M-12	3,000
M-2	2,000
M16	250,000
M-79	2,000
XM-148	5,000
M60	750,000
CQR-15	100,000

4. RESOURCES FACILITIES: (C)

(a) Security personnel constructed a 74-foot tower (65 feet ground to floor) designated Golf-10, which commands a view of the entire Northwest perimeter and portions beyond the potentially hostile ridgeline parallel to the West. The two-man tower, armed with a .50 Caliber machine-gun, became operational on 13 February 1969.

(b) Barracks building #562 was opened to accommodate the 57 men of "A" Flight Security.

(c) Quick Reaction Team (QTR) response containers were built and placed outside the Armory. The equipment issue time was subsequently reduced by 25 percent, Containers for 'IC" rations and flight gear were constructed and located in the Guardmount area to provide better equipment protection and security.

(d) We have submitted a Work Order Request for the construction of a protective blast wall to surround the Armory and Guardmount area.

(e) Security Operations in February undertook a crash program to improve the effectiveness of a most helpful facility--the perimeter. For two days during the final week of February an Army helicopter chemical team conducted aerial defoliation spraying in area from circa 150 meters inside the perimeter to 200 meters outside, The results, primarily around the Northeast and Northwest sectors, were considered reasonably successful against broad-leaf-foliage.

CHAPTER II
OPERATIONS (C)

1. For a span of roughly 4 ½ months the enemy suspended overt hostilities against Phan Rang Air Base, with the period 11 September 68 to 25 January 69, one in which local enemy activity was concentrated against less ambitious civilian and military targets, and in-known or suspected reconnaissance probes of the Air Base perimeter.
      Late in the evening of 25 January 69, and primarily early in the morning of 26 January, the enemy terminated the lull with a combined sapper mortar, and rocket attack of an intensity, duration, and sophistication unprecedented in coastal II Corps.
      The attack, composed in the main of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldiers of the H-13 NVA Sapper CO, an arm of the 351st NVA Sapper Battalion which infiltrated circa May 1968, was undirected, unexpected, and unsuccessful. The men of the 35th Security Police, many new to Vietnam and untried, were tested mightily, and prevailed. The attack was to be a pre-Tet (17-19 Feb) forerunner in a series of 9 attacks the remainder of which were a standoff-barrage nature culminating in the post-Tet offensive of 15-24 March 1969.

2. The January-March quarter was one of learning, developing, and maturing for men, equipment, and procedure. What was theory became practice in close coordination among Security Police Specialists. The Squadron's Installation Coordination Center (ICC) expanded or improved radio and personnel coordination with FAC aircraft "Spooky" and "Shadow" gunships, helicopter gunships, and available sources of ground and aerial support. The squadron's Central Security Control (CSC) and ICC worked closely to maximize the effect of internal and external defense cooperation. The security mission was unchanged.

ALBERT C. ROCK III, 1Lt, USAF

Three Attachments:
1. Breakdown of Attacks during Quarter. (U)
2. Combat Operations After Action Report, 26 Jan 69, (S) w/o atch
3. Combat Operations After Action Report, 22 Feb - 69, (C) w/o atch

Approved

DONALD E. REEVES, Lt Colonel, USAF Chief, Security Police

WHEN ATTACHMENT #2 IS WITHDRAWN OR NOT ATTACHED, THIS REPORT IS CONFIDENTIAL

21 AUG 1989, PSP-69-12
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

[Report Request Date: 21 AUG 1989]

I had the honor and privilege to served under Lt. Col. Grath A. Wright when he was Chief of Security Police at F.E.Warren AFB Cheyenne Wyo. He use to tell all of us NCO's of the days when he was corporal in the British Army! Did you know that before he came to Security Police he was with the SAS*?

Gary Sitchler
Security, Ext. 1500

* [British Army's Special Air Service (equivalent to American Green Berets) -- survival under the most extreme circumstances.]